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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY THE PAPER IS IMPORTANT
With his analysis of Rick Santorum’s political campaign ad Welcome to Obamaville,
Scott Jacobs provides an important reflection on the ethical dimensions of election
campaigning in the United States and the way some politicians treat their electorate.
Far from being the kind of open, honest, and argument-based deliberation on which
the idea of democracy is based, we see in this ad—as Scott Jacobs shows in detail—a
piece of manipulative demagogy that works, even though on a much higher level of
technical and psychological sophistication, with the same tricks that have been used
by Leni Riefenstahl and Veit Harlan who directed Jud Süss, probably the most antiSemitic and demagogic movie produced in Nazi-Germany.
Being born and raised in Germany, I use these stark comparisons
deliberately. There is something at stake here. If the Santorum ad is not only a rare
outlier that can be explained, as Jacobs suggests at one point, by pure desperation of
a campaign that soon after dropped out of the race, then we should be worried—
very worried—about the ramifications of this sort of communication for the political
culture in the United States.
What exactly is the problem here? Why is the Santorum ad worrisome?
Jacobs is absolutely right when he points out that individual autonomy is a central
value in democratic societies, and that ethical principles, and responsibilities that
can be derived from these principles, are crucial for the possibility of democracy.
“People have a responsibility,” he writes in his conclusion, “to see to that those who
deserve treatment as rational agents are so treated.”
However, even though I completely agree with Jacobs’s overall assessment of
the ad and its significance for a reflection on political culture and its ethical
foundations, I think there are a few weaknesses in his argument. I would like to
point out two elements that I do not find convincing. My intention with this critique
is to strengthen his position.
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2. A FIRST CRITICAL QUESTION: WHAT IS AN ARGUMENT?
I think there is no question that the Santorum campaign produced and published the
ad Welcome to Obamaville with the intention to manipulate. Even though the thing is
only 64 seconds long, looking at Jacobs’s long list of detailed observations about
how it was made excludes the possibility that all this happened by chance. But is this
really a case that shows us something about “arguer responsibility” as the title of
Jacobs’s paper suggests? Jacobs looks at the Santorum ad and another one as “reallife cases of manipulation in argument.” What I doubt is that there is any argument
at all.
I am not sure how Jacobs would define an argument, but it is clear that the
Santorum ad can only be used as evidence for “manipulation in argument” if there is
indeed an argument. I would think, talk about an “argument” makes only sense if
there is at least something that can be interpreted as a “reason.”
Given a definition of argument that requires something that can be identified
as a reason for a claim, any claim that there is an argument in the Santorum ad can
only be justified by pointing at anything in the ad that could work as a reason for a
claim. There is no question that the ad is full of claims, or that it repeats the same
dreadful position over and over again, but the whole point of this piece of demagogy
seems to be that it deliberately uses only sublime means to paint a certain picture of
a future Obama presidency without providing anything that could support the
claims made. Jacobs acknowledges this problem, but only partly:
The interpretive problem seemed to be that the images did not really function as
evidence or proof of the narrator’s assertions. Rather, they seemed designed to grab
the audience’s attention, to activate and amplify what Santorum supporters already
intuited, to reinforce viscerally held associations, to evoke feelings and provoke
action. Illustrations of claims can serve as a sort of clarification of emotional
meaning—but much of the imagery didn’t illustrate claims at all. It seemed only to
give presence to emotion ungrounded in any claim.

Yes, exactly this seems to be the point. But there is a difference between
saying that not “much” supports the claims and, as I would say, there is nothing at
all. I would assume that everybody who intends to provide an argument in the sense
of providing reasons for a claim will be motivated to make very clear what the claim
is and what the reasons are. Nothing of this seems to be the case here. The overall
goal is disguise and obscuration, and to be as vague and unspecific as possible. So I
would encourage Scott Jacobs to clarify in which sense there is indeed an
“argument” in the ad.
3. A SECOND CRITICAL QUESTION: CAN ARGUMENTS BE MANIPULATIVE?
According to my reading, there seems to be a certain ambivalence in Scott Jacobs’s
central thesis. The paper starts with the following sentence: “One fundamental value
on which rests the rationale for argumentation is respect for the autonomy of
persons.” In the conclusion, he highlights as a “constitutive principle of the act of
argument: One’s audience is an autonomous agent who engages in rational decision2
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making. This principle,” he continues, “stands as a pragmatic precondition for
argument.”
Both statements are similar, first, in stressing the autonomy of persons and,
second, in characterizing this “value” or “principle” either as a “precondition for
argument” or something on which the rationale for argumentations “rests.” But I am
not quite sure what this actually means. Does it mean that anybody who argues
should respect the autonomy of the audience, or does it mean that any argument qua
argument is in itself an expression of respecting this autonomy?
I guess the answer to this question depends again on how one conceives an
argument. My own position to this question is again based on the traditional and
somewhat narrow understanding of an argument as a set of statements in which the
functions “claim” and “reason” are clearly distinguished. Based on this
understanding of an argument, I think, any argument whatsoever respects the
autonomy of the audience at least to a certain degree. The reason is that the practice
of justifying claims by reasons in itself is an expression of respecting those whom
the argument addresses because it leaves it to them either to accept or to criticize by
counterarguments both the reasons provided and the alleged relation between
reasons and claim. By revealing the argumentative structure, that is: by clearly
distinguishing reasons and claim, the arguer always opens up a set of elements that
can be criticized if the addressee of the argument choses to do so.
Based on these considerations I would say that every argument qua revealing
the assumptions on which a position is based respects the autonomy of persons. As
long as its elements and structure are clearly enough revealed, every argument can
be criticized. And opening up the possibility to criticize the elements and structure
of an argument is the same as offering the addressee the freedom to do so. Arguing
per se, I would claim, is respecting the autonomy of persons.
The manipulator, by contrast, does not have any intention to reveal what he
or she is doing. The success of manipulation depends on secrecy regarding the
methods used, and often even regarding someone’s true motives. While the arguer is
ready to provide reasons if asked to do so—, as Plato famously put
it—the manipulator must have every intention not to be caught and revealed as the
morally appalling figure he or she is. This, I think, is the main reason why there is no
argument in the Santorum ad. Arguing and manipulating are going into different
directions regarding openness and secrecy.
4. CONCLUSION
Taking my two critical comments together, my main question is how Scott Jacobs
would define an “argument.” According to my definition that simply focuses on
providing reasons for a claim, there is not much of an “arguer’s responsibility”
because if somebody is an arguer, this person—by definition—is ready to provide
reasons for claims and fulfils thus much that can be expected from an ethical point
of view.
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